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I. INTRODUCTION

In Strickland v. Washington,' the Supreme Court defined the Sixth
Amendment constitutional right to counsel to include the right to the
effective assistance of counsel.2 In its decision, the Court acknowledged
that the role of counsel is critical to the ability of the adversarial system
to best ensure that just results are produced.3 The Court did not
elaborately define this constitutional requirement; subsequently, lower
courts have set the bar shockingly low. 4 This Article examines the quality
of attorneys who litigate Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) cases,
and concludes that a failure to apply a higher standard-beyond what was
set out in Strickland-results in humiliation, shame, and lack of dignity
for clients.
We define shame as the emotion we experience when we realize that
we are not living up to our standards or ideals. "On a cognitive level, there
is the painful awareness of being a failure, deficient, or inadequate.
Shame can occur alone or with another who causes or heightens the
experience. The shamed person feels exposed and wants to hide.5
Humiliation is the emotional experience of being lowered in status,
usually by another person. There is the associated sense of powerlessness.
Shame and humiliation are often felt in combination with one another,
and thus we will refer to both and detail how these emotions are generated
as a direct result of our treatment of individuals who have been labeled
as sexual offenders.
The volatile "arranged marriage" 6 of law and psychology in sex
offender civil commitment cases requires attorneys to have a particular
set of skills and knowledge in order to conduct a fair, judicious, and
1.
2.
3.
4.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Id at 685-86.
Id at 685.
For astounding examples in death penalty cases, see MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL

DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY: THE SHAME OF THE STATES viii (2013).

5. Aaron Lazare & Wilton S. Sogg, Shame, HumiliationandStigma in the Attorney-Client
Relationship, 47 PRAC. LAw. 11, 12 (2001).
6. See Michael L. Perlin, The Legal Status of the Psychologist in the Courtroom, 5 J.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 41, 53 n.39 (1977).
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ethical trial, and to secure an accurate verdict. This is necessary to not
only preserve the dignity of the legal system, but also to preserve the
dignity of their clients facing what is most likely considered one of the
most undignified adjudicative determinations: that of "sexually violent
predator." Without specialized training and expert collaboration,
attorneys cannot provide even remotely adequate or effective
representation. 7
In this Article, we explore how an understanding of the concepts of
shame and humiliation is critical to an understanding of the legal issues
we discuss here, and we will "tease out" the meanings of these concepts
in the specific context of the way that representation is (or is not) provided
in SVPA cases.
We will consider these issues in this manner: Part II will discuss the
application of the Strickland standard in SVPA cases; Part III will
consider the significance of shame and humiliation in the legal process
and the need for the judicial process to enforce standards of dignity; Part
TV will demonstrate the harms caused by the failure to comply with even
the minimal Strickland standards; Part V will explain the bases of
therapeutic jurisprudence, which is vital to any understanding of the
underlying issues, and will offer suggestions to prevent and minimize
client shame, humiliation, and lack of dignity; and Part VI will offer some
modest conclusions.

II. STRICKLAND

AND

SVPA

CASES

For the past thirty-three years, the standard set out by the Supreme
Court in Strickland has governed the question of adequacy of counsel in
criminal trials. Under Strickland, effectiveness of counsel is defined
pallidly as requiring simply that counsel's efforts be "reasonable" under
the circumstances.' The benchmark for judging an ineffectiveness claim
is simply "whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as
having produced a just result." 9 Post-Stricklandcases involving mental
status issues outside the ken of most lawyers'o have re-enforced what
7. See generally Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, "Farfrom the Turbulent
Space": Considering the Adequacy of Counsel in the Representation of Individuals Accused of
Being Sexually Violent Predators, 18 U. PA. J.L. & Soc. CHANGE 125 (2015) [hereinafter Cucolo
& Perlin, "FarFrom the Turbulent Space"].

8.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See also Gary Feldon & Tara

Beech, Unpacking the First Prong of the Strickland Standard: How to Identify Controlling
Precedent and Determine Prevailing Professional Norms in Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Cases, 23 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 2 (2012).

9.
10.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
See, e.g., MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 405
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Judge David Bazelon characterized some forty years ago as "walking
violations of the Sixth Amendment,"" and, in many instances, have
produced "appalling results."' 2
Importantly, in Strickland, there was no hint at all as to what its impact
might be on other cases that were not criminal prosecutions, but that
potentially involved lengthy periods of institutionalization." Writing
about Strickland some years ago, one of the co-authors (MLP) noted that
the availability of organized, specialized, and aggressive counsel in civil
commitment is largely illusory, and the level of representation remains
almost uniformly substandard.14
Then, fifteen years ago, in In re Mental Health of KG.F, the
Montana Supreme Court acknowledged that the Strickland standard
might not be a sufficient test of adequacy in cases involving involuntary
civil commitment. 16 The court eschewed the Strickland standard of
effectiveness and instead found that the standard insufficiently protected
the "liberty interests of individuals such as K.G.F., who may or may not
have broken any law, but who, upon the expiration of a 90-day
commitment, must indefinitely bear the badge of inferiority of a once
'involuntarily committed' person with a proven mental disorder." 7
Importantly, one of the key reasons why Strickland was seen as lacking
was the court's conclusion that "reasonable professional assistance"-the
linchpin of the Strickland decision-"cannot be presumed in a proceeding
that routinely accepts-and even requires-an unreasonably low standard
of legal assistance and generally disdains zealous, adversarial
confrontation."' 8
The K G.F. case profoundly recognizes the necessity to apply a more
rigorous standard than the one accepted by the Supreme Court in
Strickland-especially for proceedings that require specialized
knowledge and expertise and have the potential to result in lifetime
stigma and confinement. In the authors' opinions, there are no other
(1995); MICHAEL L. PERLIN, A PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY: RETHINKING CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND
MENTAL DISABILITY LAW (2013) [hereinafter PERLIN, A PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY].

I1.
12.

David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 2 (1973).
Welsh S. White, Capital Punishment's Future, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1429, 1436 (1993)

(reviewing RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1991)).

13.
14.

Cucolo & Perlin, "FarFrom the Turbulent Space," supra note 7, at 128.
Michael L. Perlin, You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks: Sanism in Clinical

Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 683, 690 (2003) (quoting, in part, Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A.
Dorfman, Is It More Than "DodgingLions and Wastin' Time"? Adequacy ofCounsel, Questions
of Competence, and the Judicial Process in Individual Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 2
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 114, 122 (1996)).

15.
16.

In re K.G.F., 29 P.3d 485, 492 (Mont. 2001).
Id. at 491.

17. Id.
18. Id. at 492 (citing Michael L. Perlin, FatalAssumption: A CriticalEvaluation ofthe Role
of Counsel in Mental DisabilityCases, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 39, 53-54 (1992)).
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proceedings more in need of a higher standard than SVPA proceedings,
ones that are invariably and inevitably inundated with stigma, shame, and
humiliation.
These Acts apply to "any person who has been convicted of or charged
with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to
engage in the repeat acts of sexual violence."' 9 Such individuals can be
committed indefinitely; in a significant percentage of these cases, such
commitments are, basically, life sentences. 2 0
Such cases are, following the Supreme Court's decision in Kansas v.
Hendricks,2 1 classified as "civil" rather than "criminal," because they
involve "involuntary civil confinement of a limited subclass of dangerous
persons."2 2 Such persons are not only considered dangerous but are
universally deemed to be the most despised and heinous population of
individuals. 2 3 Society's general revulsion toward this population is shared
by judges, jurors and lawyers. 2 4 Although the bar pays lip service to the
bromide that counsel is available for all, no matter how unpopular the
cause, the reality is that there are few volunteers for the job of
representing these individuals, and that the public's enmity has a chilling
effect on the vigorous of representation in this area.
Compounding the stigma associated with individuals who fall under
the SVPA is the complex evidence often produced at SVPA
proceedings. 25 Expert witnesses commonly utilize and interpret several
19.

KAN. STAT. ANN.

§ 59-29a02(a) (2016).

20. See, e.g., Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide between Collateral and Direct
Consequences of CriminalConvictions: Involuntary Commitment of "Sexually Violent Predators,"

93 MINN. L. REv. 670, 707 (2008).
21. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
22. Id. at 356.
23. See Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, Preventing Sex-Offender Recidivism
Through Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approaches and Specialized Community Integration, 22
TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 1, 5 (2012) [hereinafter Cucolo & Perlin, PreventingSex-Offender
Recidivism] ("Currently, no other population is more despised, more vilified, more subject to
media misrepresentation, and more likely to be denied basic human rights."). Although it has been
common wisdom for years that the phrase "the worst of the worst" was typically meant to refer to
those subject to the death penalty, see, e.g., Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 206 (2006) (Souter,
J., dissenting) ("[W]ithin the category of capital crimes, the death penalty must be reserved for
'the worst of the worst"'); in actuality, it is now generally reserved for this population, see Nora
V. Demleitner, Misguided Prevention: The War on Terrorism as a War on Immigrant Offenders
and Immigration Violators, 40 CRIM. L. BULL. 550, 573 (2004) (sex offenders are "styled as 'the

worst of the worst' as a consequence . .

of their sex offense").

24. Cucolo & Perlin, PreventingSex-Offender Recidivism, supra note 23, at 67; Kevin J.
Breer, Beyond Hendricks: The United States Supreme Court Decision in Kansas v. Crane and
Other Issues ConcerningKansas'Sexually Violent PredatorAct, 71 J. KAN. BAR Ass'N 13 (2002)
("Sex offenders are the scourge of modern America, the "irredeemable monsters" who prey on
the innocent.").
25. Many of these experts base their predictions heavily on "actuarial tests" such as:
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controversial psychometric tests, 26 and in order to effectively combat
such evidence lawyers must have familiarity with and a working
knowledge of these instruments and with the literature about their validity
and reliability.27 In many instances, counsel would need to consult with
an independent expert to adequately defend his or her client's case.
Without a guaranteed right to such expertise, it is even less likely that
counsel will be able to ably launch a defense in such cases. 28
III. SHAME, HUMILIATION AND LACK OF DIGNITY IN THE LAW
"Criminal justice policy regarding serious offenders is no longer
focused on what was previously '. . . a progressive sense of justice, an
evocation of what "decency" and "humanity" required, and a compassion
for the needs and rights of the less fortunate."' 29 Instead, sex offender
treatment in the United States is influenced by legislation that
increasingly characterizes sex offenders as "lifelong predators who will

*

*

*

Vernon L. Quinsey et al., Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG), in
Violent Offenders: Appraising and Managing Risk 283-86 (2d ed.
2006);
Vernon L. Quinsey et al., Sex Offender Risk Appraisal Guide
(SORAG), in Violent Offenders: Appraising and Managing Risk 24144 (1998);
R.

Karl

HANSON,

DEP'T OF THE SOLICITOR GEN. OF CAN., The

Development of a Brief Actuarial Risk Scale for Sexual Offense
Recidivism 14 (1997); and
*

Douglas L. Epperson et al., MINNESOTA SEX OFFENDER SCREENING

TOOL- Revised (MnSOST-R): Development, Validation,
Recommended Risk Level Cut Scores 36-38 tbl.2 (2003).
26.

See,

e.g., TERENCE W. CAMPBELL,

ASSESSING

and

SEX OFFENDERS: PROBLEMS AND

PITFALLS 76 (2004) (criticizing the STATIC-99 test), as discussed in Frederick E. Vars,
Rethinking the Indefinite Detention of Sex Offenders, 44 CONN. L. REV. 161, 167 (2011). The
Static-99 is a ten-item actuarial assessment instrument for use with adult male sexual offenders
who are at least 18 year of age at time of release to the community. R. Karl Hanson & David
Thornton, STATIC-99 Tally Sheet, STATIC-99 CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.static99.org/pdfdocs/

static-99-coding-rules e71.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2014). It is the most widely used sex offender
risk assessment instrument in the world, and is extensively used in the United States, Canada, the
United Kingdom, Australia, and many European nations. Static-99 Documents, STATIC-99
CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.static99.org (last visited Apr. 10, 2017).
27. Richard Hamill, Recidivism of Sex Offenders: What You Need to Know, 15 CRIM. JUST.
24, 30 (2001).
28. Although the Supreme Court has held in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 86 (1985), that
a defendant has a right to an independent expert in a felony trial, there is scant analogous case or
statutory law with regard to SVPA matters.
29. Astrid Birgden & Heather Ellis Cucolo, The Treatment of Sex Offenders: Evidence,
Ethics and Human Rights, 23 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 295, 295 (2011) (citations

omitted).
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seek out new victims as long as they live." 3 0
In a previous article, one of the co-authors (MLP) argued,
"humiliation and shaming contravene basic fundamental human rights
and raise important constitutional questions." 3 1 These practices lead to
recidivism, inhibit rehabilitation, discourage treatment, and injure
victims.32 They also directly contravene the guiding principles of
therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) especially in the context of its relationship
to the importance of dignity in the law. 3 3 We believe that nowhere is this
more so than in the context of SVPA cases.
Shame forces a downward redefinition of oneself; 34 "the thrust of
[shame's] aggression is to dehumanize."35 It is bordered by
"embarrassment, humiliation, and mortification, in porous ways that are
difficult to predict or contain," 3 6 and is "one of the most important,
painful and intensive of all emotions."3 7 Shaming is public; its
dehumanization and social demotion occurs when a shameful trait or act
becomes "visible, and is exposed to others." 38
According to Professor Martha Nussbaum, when "shame is a large
part of their problem ... expos[ing] that person to humiliation may often
shatter the all-too-fragile defenses of the person's ego. The result might
be utter collapse." 39 By marginalizing the rights of those who are shamed
and humiliated, such individuals are treated as less than human. 4 0
30.

Id. at 296 (citations omitted).

31. Michael L. Perlin & Naomi M. Weinstein, "Friend to the Martyr, a Friend to the
Woman ofShame": Thinking About the Law, Shame and Humiliation, 24 S. CAL. REV. L. & Soc.
JuST. 1, 5 (2014).

32.

Id.

33. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "There Are No Trials inside the Gates of Eden ": Mental
Health Courts, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dignity, and the
Promise of Therapeutic Jurisprudence,in COERCIVE CARE: RIGHTS, LAW AND POLICY 193, 196
(Bernadette McSherry & Ian Freckelton eds., 2013). In the context of sex offender law, see Cucolo
& Perlin, Preventing Sex-Offender Recidivism, supra note 23, at 34-35.
34. Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV.
1880, 1901 (1991) [hereinafter Massaro, Shame, Culture, andAmerican CriminalLaw].
35. LEON WURMSER, THE MASK OF SHAME 81 (1981) (emphasis added).
36. Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame: Implicationsfor Legal Reform, 3 PSYCHOL.

PUB. POL'Y & L. 645, 703 (1997) [hereinafter Massaro, The Meanings ofShame].
37. Robert Svensson et al., Moral Emotions and Offending: Do Feelings of Anticipated
Shame and Guilt Mediate the Effect ofSocialization on Offending?, 10 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 22,

23 (2013).
38. Massaro, Shame, Culture, andAmerican Criminal Law, supra note 34, at 1901 (citing
CARL D. SCHNEIDER, SHAME, EXPOSURE AND PRIVACY 34-35 (1977)).
39.

MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW 236

(2004).
40.

Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassmentwith Respect, Il 1 HARV. L. REV. 445,

489-90 (1997). On how humiliation is contrary to both the aims of therapeutic jurisprudence, see
infra Part VI, and restorative justice, see, e.g., Kathleen Daly, Restorative Justice and Sexual
Assault: An Archival Study of Court and Conference Cases, 46 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 334, 335-36 (2006) (providing a brief description of restorative justice); PERLIN, A PRESCRIPTION FOR
DIGNITY, supra note 10, at 79. Restorative justice is a means by which to restore victims, restore
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Shaming sanctions may be psychologically debilitating. Carole
McKindley-Alvarez, the director of a mental health program for
juveniles, has directly criticized the shaming approach stating that "[a]ll
of our mental health programs end up having more and more people come
in with trauma at the hands of humiliation . .. the behavior [will] show
up in different ways . . . [and] unfortunately, the morgue may see that
person." 4 1 Importantly, in the context of this article, shaming "exploits
one's fear of shunning by others, or of banishment from the
community."42
In addition, proponents of shaming sanctions fail to recognize that
shaming sanctions convey the message that offenders are less than human
and that offenders deserve our individual and collective contempt. 4 3
"Sending this kind of message, even about criminal offenders, is, and
should be, jarring in a political order that makes equality a cultural
baseline."" It is hard to imagine how shaming penalties that are crude
and degrading will foster respect for the law.45 It is more likely that they
are frequently counter-productive. 4 6
"Three common maladaptive responses to shame are depression,
offenders, and restore communities "in a way that all stakeholders can agree is just." John
Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized: Realistic or Utopian?, 46 UCLA L.
REV. 1727, 1743 (1999); see, e.g., Michael G. Petrunik, Managing Unacceptable Risk: Sex
Offenders, Community Response, and Social Policy in the United States and Canada, 46 INT'L J.
OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 483, 506 (2002) (comparing risk management model
for control of sex offenders with earlier models, and with a restorative justice model), there is-

to the best of our knowledge-only one mention in the legal literature (a student note) that raises
the potential connection between restorative justice and shaming in a sex offender context. See
Meaghan Kelly, Lock Them Up-and Throw Away the Key: The Preventive Detention of Sex
Offenders in the United States and Germany, 39 GEO. J. INT'L L. 551, 572 (2008). There is nothing
in the literature that raises its connection with humiliation.
41. Luke Coyne, Can Shame Be Therapeutic?,7 ARIZ. SUMMIT L. REV. 539, 557 (2012).
42. Massaro, Shame, Culture, andAmerican CriminalLaw, supranote 34, at 1903. Beyond

the scope of this Article is the further discussion of banishment through residency restrictions in
the community. See Cucolo & Perlin, PreventingSex-Offender Recidivism, supra note 23, at 40.
43. Massaro, The Meanings ofShame, supra note 36, at 699.

44.

Id. at 700.

45. Paul Ziel, Eighteenth Century Public HumiliationPenalties in Twenty-First Century
America: The "Shameful" Return of "ScarletLetter" Punishments in U.S. v. Gementera, 19 BYU

J. Pun. L. 499, 509-10 (2005).
46. On how some police actions shame and humiliate persons with mental disabilities in
general, see Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, "To Wander Off in Shame": Deconstructing
the Shaming and Shameful Arrest Policies of Urban Police Departments in Their Treatment of
Persons with Mental Disabilities, in POWER, HUMILIATION AND VIOLENCE (forthcoming Daniel
Rothbart ed., 2017) (manuscript, at 14) (on file with authors), available at

https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2839820. On how our juvenile justice
system shames and humiliates juveniles facing civil commitment and those facing criminal
confinement, see Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, "She's Nobody's Child/The Law Can't
Touch Her at All": Seeking to Bring Dignity to Legal Proceedings Involving Juveniles 13
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.

cfm?abstract-id=2912499 [hereinafter Perlin & Lynch, Nobody's Child].
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hiding/avoidance, and anger." 47 Hiding/avoidance can often lead to a
denial of the problem. 4 8 Anger may lead to acts of revenge. 49 These
behavioral responses to shame are likely to undermine the goals of
shaming.so It is no wonder, since "the natural response to shame is to
cover the source of the shame[.]" 5 1 And, the all-too-frequent "response to

sexual shame seems to be: more shame." 52
The determinants of shame have been identified as:
* The shame-inducing event;
* The vulnerability of the subject; and
* The social context, which includes the roles of people involved.5 3
We argue here that the shame-inducing event (in this case, the SVPA
hearing) and the individual's vulnerability ultimately interact with a
social context when the client seeks professional help. Thus, the entire
structure of the SVPA system is one that is based on shame and
humiliation.
Society constructs this population as "monsters" so that we can more
easily dehumanize them. 54 Those subject to SVPA proceedings are
marginalized even further and it is virtually impossible for any fact-finder
to "connect with" or empathize with the victims on any level.55 Nearly
twenty years ago, a student comment noted that "it is a reasonable
emotional response to desire revenge upon the sex offender, not to care
about his civil rights, and to see him as less than human." 56 Recently, one
of the co-authors (MLP) has argued that the use of humiliation
techniques, "whether done in overt or passive ways, [also] violates rights
to due process, privacy, and freedom from cruel and unusual
punishment." 5 7

The public justifies the devaluation of the rights of convicted sex
47.

Lazare & Sogg, supra note 5, at 15.

48.
49.

Id
Id

50.

Toni M. Massaro, Show (Some) Emotions, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 80, 99 (Susan

Bandes ed., 1999).
51.

George P. Fletcher, Thinking aboutEden: A Tribute to HerbertMorris, 22 QUINNIPIAC

L. REv. 1, 16 (2003).
52. MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETICS OF
QUEER LIFE 3 (1999).
53. Lazare & Sogg, supra note 5, at 12.
54. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Undertakingthe Task ofReforming the American Character
Evidence Prohibition: The Importance of Getting the Experiment off on the Right Foot, 22
FORDHAMURB. L.J. 285, 296 (1995).
55. Fredrick E. Vars, Fear ofan UndeterrableOther, 75 LA. L. REv. 1, 16 (2014).
56. Amy M. Lageman, Dangerous Offender Legislation:A Short Term Solution to a Long
Term Problem, 16 DICK. J. INT'L L. 203, 224 (1997).
57. Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 31, at 10.
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offenders because of the incessant dehumanizing portrayal of them as
"lions in the tall grass waiting to attack," "monsters," "beast[s]," and even
"the human equivalent of toxic waste." 58
It is no surprise that the vast majority of sex offenders self-report
being humiliated on a daily basis. 59 Humiliation has been broadly defined
as "the rejection of human beings as human, that is, treating people as if
they were not human beings but merely things, tools, animals,
subhumans, or inferior humans." 60 Humiliation can also reflect "a loss of
control over one's identity," or "being denied a certain status in
communion with others." 6 1
We have argued in the past that this dehumanizing treatment 62 ma
have the effect of actually increasing sex offender recidivism rates.
Philosopher Jeremy Waldron has noted that the predictable response to
humiliation is for its target to "lash out at the humiliator" via a
combination of anger and fear.M Aggression seems to be predictably,
automatically, and at times, uncontrollably activated in response to
humiliation.6 5
While humiliation and shame share many characteristics, humiliation
involves more emphasis on an interaction in which one is debased or
forced into a degraded position by someone who is, at that moment, more
powerful.6 6 Humiliation is also interpersonal,rather than wholly internal
58. Amy Grover, Delinquency and Punishment: The Impact of State v. Williams on
Juvenile Sex Offender Registration in Ohio, 81 CIN. L. REV. 291, 302-03 (2013) (citations

omitted).
59. Richard G. Zevitz & Mary Ann Farkas, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., SEX OFFENDER
COMMUNiTY NOTIFICATION: ASSESSING THE IMPACT IN WISCONSIN 9 (2002), www.ncjrs.gov/

pdffilesl/nij/179992.pdf (finding that 75% of interviewed sex offenders told of being humiliated
in their daily lives due to expanded notification actions).
60.

Bernstein, supra note 40, at 489 (quoting Avishai Margalit, THIE DECENT SOCIETY 121

(1996)).
61. Claire Wright, Censoring the Censors in the WTO: Reconciling the Communitarian
and Human Rights Theories of International Law, 3 J. INT'L MEDIA & ENT. L. 17, 102 n.534

(2010).
62.

This dehumanization has occurred at least since the days of J. Edgar Hoover who

described the "sex fiend" as the "most loathsome of all the vast army of crime." Vars, supra note
55 (citing Jack Frosch & Walter Bromberg, The Sex Offender-A Psychiatric Study, 9 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 761 (1939)).
63. Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, "They're PlantingStories in the Press":
The Impact of Media Distortionson Sex Offender Law and Policy, 3 U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 185,
210 (2013) (citing J.J. Prescott & J.E. Rockoff, Do Sex Offender Registration and Notification

Laws Affect CriminalBehavior?, 54 J.L. & ECON. 161 (2011)).
64. Jeremy Waldron, On Humiliation, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1787, 1801 (1995) (reviewing
WILLIAM IAN MILLER, HUMILIATION, AND OTHER ESSAYS ON HONOR, SOCIAL DISCOMFORT, AND
VIOLENCE (1993)).
65. Diane Trumbull, Humiliation: The Trauma of Disrespect, 36 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHOANALYSIS 643, 650 (2008).
66. Linda M. Hartling & Tracy Luchetta, Humiliation:Assessing the Impact of Derision,
Degradation, and Debasement, 19 J. PRIMA.RY PREVENTION 259, 262 (1999) (citing Susan B.
Miller, Humiliationand Shame, 52 BULL. MENNINGER CLINIC 40 (1988)).
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to a person (as shame may be), and often triadic, "requiring one who
humiliates, one who is humiliated, and one witness (or more) whose good
opinion is important to the one humiliated." 6 7 Studies show the
devastating consequences of systematic humiliation, 6 8 and demonstrate
that humiliation can cause depression, paranoia, violence, generalized
and social anxiety, and suicide. 6 9
In recent years, scholars and activists from multiple disciplines have
begun to devote themselves to the study of humiliation and how it robs
the legal system and society of dignity. 70 The Human Dignity and
Humiliation Studies Network explicitly underscores this in its mandate:
"We wish to stimulate systemic change, globally and locally, to open
space for dignity and mutual respect and esteem to take root and grow,
thus ending humiliating practices and breaking cycles of humiliation
throughout the world." 7 1
It is important to note that there is almost no empirical evidence that
shows that shaming sanctions improve society and no empirical evidence
supporting the position that shaming sanctions are beneficial to the
victims of the offense.7 2 There have been no comprehensive studies as to
whether they are even effective, nor is there any empirical work through
which the practical impact of such sanctions can be tested.7 3
It is necessary to contextualize all of this with the notion of dignity.74
Professor Carol Sanger has suggested that dignity means that people
"'possess an intrinsic worth that should be recognized and respected,' and
that they should not be subjected to treatment by the state that is
inconsistent with their intrinsic worth." 75 A notion of individual
dignity-generally articulated through concepts of autonomy, respect,
equality, and freedom from undue government interference-was at the
heart of a jurisprudential and moral outlook that resulted in the reform,
67. Catherine L. Fiske, Humiliationat Work, 8 WM. &MARYJ. WOMEN& L. 73,77 (2001)
(citing FRANCIS J. BROUCEK, SHAME AND THE SELF 75 (1991)).
68. Fiske, supra note 67, at 76. On systemic humiliation in general, see Arland D.
Jacobson, The Role of Humiliation in International Conflict, I N. PLAINS ETHICS J. 65, 78-79

(2013).

&

69. Fiske, supra note 67, at 78 (citing Donald C. Klein, The Humiliation Dynamic: An
Overview, 12 J. PRIMARY PREVENTION 93, 107-12 (1991)).
70. Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 31, at 5.
71. Id at 5-6; see generally Welcome to Human Dignity and HumiliationStudies, HUM.
DIGNITY & HUMILLATION STUD., http://www.humiliationstudies.org/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2017).
72. Coyne, supra note 41, at 555-56, 561.
73. Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 31, at 24 (citing Brian Netter, Avoiding the Shameful
Backlash: Social Repercussionsfor the Increased Use ofAlternative Sanctions, 96 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY 187, 215 (2005)).

74.

On the relationship between dignity and "human worth," see Amanda Ploch, Why

Dignity Matters: Dignity and the Right (orNot) to Rehabilitationfrom InternationalandNational

Perspectives, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 887, 895-97 (2012).
75.

Carol Sanger, DecisionalDignity: Teenage Abortion, Bypass Hearings, andthe Misuse

of Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409, 415 (2009).
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not only of criminal procedure, but of the various institutions more or less
directly linked with the criminal justice system, including juvenile courts,
prisons, and mental institutions. 7 6
Fair process norms such as the right to counsel "operate as substantive
and procedural restraints on state power to ensure that the individual
suspect is treated with dignity and respect." 7 7 Dignity is demanded not
only by American constitutional norms;7 8 international human rights law
also requires it. 7 9 These principles should apply equally in the context of
the treatment of sex offenders who are-we can never forgetinstitutionalized as civil patients.80

IV. LACK OF COMPLIANCE WITH STRICKLAND GUARANTEES AND THE
RESULTING HARM

An individual facing civil commitment as a sex offender may be
assigned counsel but is not necessarily afforded the absolute right to have
an appointed attorney.8 ' Jurisdictions vary on the availability and
constitutionality of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.8 2 By way of
example, if a person is indigent, Kansas has required the State to provide,
at public expense, the assistance of counsel and an examination by mental
health care professionals. 8 3 The Kansas Court of Appeals has mandated
that if appointed counsel is not engaged, not responsive or otherwise not
active, the court is obligated to investigate or to appoint new counsel
declaring that there is a clear statutory requirement that counsel be
provided "at all stages of the proceedings. "84 Yet in other states, the right
76.

Eric J. Miller, EmbracingAddiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise ofJudicial

Interventionism, 65 Oi-1o ST. L.J. 1479, 1569 n.463 (2004).
77. Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and
Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 200 (1983).
78. See Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 31, at 18-19 (discussing, inter alia, Lawrence v.

Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) (declaring unconstitutional Texas sodomy law)); Safford
Unified School District No. I v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 366 (2009) (strip search of 13 year old
girl by school principal violated her expectations of privacy); United States v. Windsor, 133 S.
Ct. 2675 (2013) (striking down portions of Defense of Marriage Act)).
79. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "Strikingfor the Guardiansand Protectorsofthe Mind":
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilitiesand the Future of GuardianshipLaw,

117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1159, 1174-76 (2013) (discussing dignity requirements in U.N. Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities).
80. See MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, SHAMING THE CONSTITUTION: THE
DETRIMENTAL RESULTS OF SEXUAL VIOLENT PREDATOR LEGISLATION (2017).

81.

Ramsey v. Runion, No. 2:11cv396, 2012 WL 3883378, at *5 (E.D. Va. Sept. 5,2012);

Cucolo & Perlin, "Farfrom the TurbulentSpace," supra note 7, at 134.

82.

See Commitment of Dodge, 2013 IL App (1st) 113603,

¶ 20

(although the Sexually

Violent Persons Commitment Act (Act) proceedings are civil in nature, the Act provides a
defendant with the right to effective assistance of counsel as provided in Strickland).

83.
84.

KAN. STAT. ANN.

§ 59-29a06 (2017).

In re Miles, 213 P.3d 1077, 1080 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009). Citing to petitioners' pro se
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to counsel at each stage in the commitment process is not automatically
granted and has been denied during pre-commitment evaluations8 5 as
well as during the psychological evaluation for the annual review
hearing. 8 6
The quality of counsel and the threshold of constitutional rights have
been debated in cases where defendants have sought to withdraw a plea
bargain because they were not informed of the potential consequences of
a sex offender conviction. The Supreme Court has yet to address this
issue, and there is lack of uniformity in the state courts. New Jersey
appears to be one of the only states that require counsel to inform the
defendant that pleading guilty might qualify them for sexual offender
civil commitment. 87 Other state courts have mandated a duty to inform
when the plea would result in sexual offender registration.8 8 Most state
courts found no duty to inform, because civil commitment is not a direct
result of the plea, but merely a collateral consequence. 8 9 A South Carolina
court ruled that although the criminal conviction is the triggering event
for the SVPA the attorney had no duty to inform the offender about the
SVPA before he pleaded guilty. 90 The Kansas Court of Appeals reasoned
that even if the defendant was informed of the SVPA, the chance of losing
at trial and facing a longer prison sentence, would deter a guilty plea
retraction. The question remains whether the defendant's decision to
plead guilty took into account the fact that a potential life sentence
response, the court underscored:
The problem Petitioners are experiencing is with the attorneys appointed by the
Court of Wyandotte County. These attorney's [sic] of record rarely, if ever,
consult with their clients during the annual review period and almost never send
any documentation as to any judgment or action taken in their case. Hence, the
patient has no alternative to but to file his own petition without the assistance of

counsel.
Id. at 1082-83.
85. See, e.g., Greenfield v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 888 A.2d 507, 511 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2006) (sex offender had no due process right to review materials or meet with a committee
addressing his possible referral to the state's attorney general for commitment as a sexually violent
predator).

86.
87.

In re Petersen, 980 P.2d 1204, 1215 (Wash. 1999).
State v. Bellamy, 835 A.2d 1231, 1234 (N.J. 2003) (holding that prior to accepting a

guilty plea to a predicate offense, trial courts must inform defendants of possible consequences
under the Act).

88. Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384, 385 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that counsel is
constitutionally deficient if they did not advise their client that pleading guilty will subject the
client to the sex offender registration requirements).

89. In re Campbell, 986 P.2d 771, 780-81 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (en banc), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 1125 (2001) (holding that a civil commitment, like sex offender registration, is a
collateral consequence of pleading guilty and does not violate the plea agreement).

90.

Page v. State, 615 S.E.2d 740, 742 (S.C. 2005); see Roberts, supranote 20, at 693-700

(providing an insightful look into collateral consequences discussed in Page v. State).
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attached to civil commitment.
We cannot merely consider the constitutional right to counsel but must
discuss that right in combination with the quality of counsel and the
ability of counsel to minimize clients' shame, humiliation and the
resulting lack of dignity. To be successful in this endeavor, attorneys
must understand the contributing factors that occur during SVPA court
proceedings. Some of these factors include: the effects of psychometric
tests; the use of hearsay evidence; the lack of confidentiality in treatment
and use of treatment-induced statements in court; and the resulting
condemnation of judges.
A. Psychometric Tests: The Scarlet Number
Expert predictions of future violence, which is "central to the ultimate
question [of] ... whether petitioners suffer from a mental abnormality or
personality disorder," 9 1 are believed to be necessary in the civil
commitment of sexual offenders. 9 2 The concept that humans can
accurately predict the criminal or aberrant behavior of other humans in
the long-term future has created the need for the development of actuarial
instruments that allegedly remove the "human" element of error when
predicting future risk.9 3
In greatly simplified terms, there are two broad approaches to
conducting risk assessments to predict future dangerous sexual behavior:
clinical judgment and actuarial assessment. 9 4 The clinical approach
requires evaluators to consider a wide range of risk factors and then form
an overall opinion concerning future dangerousness. 95 The actuarial
approach evaluates a limited set of predictors and then combines these
variables using a predetermined, numerical weighting system to
determine future risk of re-offense, 9 6 which may be adjusted (or not) by
expert evaluators considering potentially important factors not included
in the actuarial measure.9 7
91.

In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1017 (Wash. 1993) (en banc), supersededby statute, WASH.

REV. CODE

§ 71.09.010-.903 (2014), as recognized in In re Thorell, 72 P.3d 708, 720-21 (Wash.

2003) (en banc). See generally supra text note 25.

92. In re Holtz, 653 N.W.2d 613, 619 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002) (concluding that if scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify).

93.

See In re Burton, 884 So. 2d 1112, 1119 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (Altenbernd, C.J.,

concurring) (discussing the use of actuarial instruments in predicting future human behavior in
violent sex offenders).
94. See, e.g., DENNIS M. DOREN, EVALUATING SEX OFFENDERS: A MANUAL FOR CIVIL
COMMITMENTS AND BEYOND 104 (2002).

95.
96.
97.

Id
Id. at 105.
Id.
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Courts must contend with finding the correct standard that balances
the potential for unfair prejudice against the evidence's probative value. 98
In spite of the knowledge that testimony predicting the future
dangerousness of a person who has been convicted of a sexual offense is
undoubtedly prejudicial, some courts have deemed actuarial assessments
as appropriate tools that help the professional draw inferences about the
potential for recidivism from historical data, or the collective experience
of other professionals who have assessed sex offenders for potential
recidivism. 99 Courts have held that the adversarial protections of crossexamination and rebuttal witnesses would sufficiently allow the
defendant the opportunity to challenge actuarial instruments' validity.100
This, of course, is only effective if the defendant is afforded an
opportunity for a rebuttal witness, and has been assigned effective
counsel who is knowledgeable and able to dispute the assigned level of
risk.10
In a thorough and probing analysis of these tests, Professors Eric Janus
and Robert Prentky have concluded that, "to a greater or lesser extent, all
ARA ["actuarial risk assessment"] instruments have shortcomings, and
these shortcomings detract from the reliability of the instruments."102 Te
authors note that there are three potential sources of prejudice from ARA
testimony: first, that the scientific and statistical nature of actuarial
assessments will unduly influence the fact-finder into giving it more
weight and credibility than it deserves, and that the principle of "actuarial
superiority" will exacerbate this tendency; second, that juries will ignore
98. See generally In re Burton, 884 So. 2d 1112, 1115-17 (analyzing, under the Frye
standard, the use of psychometric tests to determine future dangerousness of people convicted of
sex crimes).

99.

See, e.g., Arizona ex rel. Romley v. Fields, 35 P.3d 82, 89 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001)

(admitting actuarial assessments into evidence, but noting that "[u]nlike DNA and other types of

'scientific' evidence, these risk assessment tools do not have an aura of scientific infallibility . .
and their predictive value is far less than 100%.").

100. E.g., In re Erbe, 800 N.E.2d 137, 155 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); see also Barefoot v. Estelle,
463 U.S. 880, 901 (1983) ("We are unconvinced, however, at least as of now, that the adversary
process cannot be trusted to sort out the reliable from the unreliable evidence and opinion about

future dangerousness"); Halleck v. Coastal Bldg. Maint. Co., 647 N.E.2d 618, 627 (Ill. App. Ct
1995) ("On cross-examination, counsel may probe an expert witness' qualifications, experience
and sincerity, the weaknesses in the basis of his opinions, the sufficiency of his assumptions, and
the general soundness of his opinion.") (citation omitted).

101.

This issue was explored in In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 171 (Minn. 1996), an early case

involving an individual committed under Minnesota's SVP law, in which the defendant,
represented by competent counsel, challenged his commitment because the state's expert had
failed to use actuarial methods in his risk assessment. Id. at 189. The defendant unsuccessfully
argued that by failing to perform actuarial analysis, the state had ignored "state of the art" evidence
and the "best available scientific knowledge and methodology." Id. The case was later vacated on
other grounds sub nom. Linehan v. Minnesota, 522 U.S. 1011 (1997).
102. Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment with
Sex Offenders: Accuracy, Admissibility and Accountability, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1443, 1472

(2003).
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the lack of "fit" between the actuarially-derived risk and the legally
relevant risk, thus giving ARA too much weight; and third, that the reality
that the "incriminating significance" of statistical probabilities is
"obscure."

03

The end result is the assignment of a corresponding number or value
to the individual being evaluated. 04 This number signifies either high or
low risk of reoffending and becomes, in essence, a "scarlet number" that
is comparable to the shaming methods behind the assignment of a "scarlet
letter" used to humiliate or draw public ridicule to women deemed
unchaste.' 0 5 If the assigned risk level generated by an actuarial tool is
high, it attaches to the individual and is used to justify commitment year
after year.' 0 6 The person is reduced to a statistic, and labeled as another
high-risk offender unworthy of liberty and freedom. o7 This is directly
related to shame and humiliation.' This impression of a dangerous
recidivist sticks despite unanswered questions as to the ethical usage and
accuracy of these predictive instruments.'
B. Evidence-InducedHumiliation
In addition to the stigma and shame associated with the actuarial tool
assigned number, sex offender commitment proceedings in and of
themselves include a handful of lax evidentiary rules that can further
contribute to the individual feeling shame and humiliation during the
103.

Id. at 1487.

104.

Two of the most commonly used actuarial prediction tools in SVP determinations are

the Rapid Risk Assessment for Sex Offence Recidivism (RRASOR) and STATIC-99. See Fred S.
Berlin et al., The Use ofActuarials at Civil Commitment Hearings to Predict the Likelihood of
FutureSexual Violence, 15 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 377, 378 (2003).
105. NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (1850).

106. See In re K.S., No. A-1451-07T2, 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 627, at *6-9 (N.J.
Super. CL App. Div. Mar. 11, 2008) (noting "high risk" score on STATIC-99 as part of
determination that commitment was proper); R. Karl Hanson et al., High-Risk Sex Offenders may
not be High Risk Forever, 29 J. INTERPERSONAL INT'L VIOLENCE 2792 (2014). The median year
of release was 1996; the release year ranged from 1957 to 2007. Hanson et al., supra 106, at 2798

tbl.1.
107.

See, e.g., Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 31, at 2 (discussing a trial judge in one sex

offender case who said, about persons who molest children, "It is my feeling that we should
probably dye them green" (citing Leonore H. Tavill, Scarlet Letter Punishment: Yesterday's
Outlawed Penalty Is Today's ProbationCondition, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 613, 644 n.193 (1988)).

108. This can be compared with the high-risk label generated by community registration tier
levels, see Doe v. Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456, 467-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating that information
provided to the community through the New York Sex Offender Registration Act carries with it

"shame, humiliation, ostracism, loss of employment and decreased opportunities for employment,
perhaps even physical violence").
109. See In re Burton, 884 So.2d 1112, 1120 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (Altenbemd, C.J.,
concurring) ("I, for one, do not yet have faith that it is wise for the judiciary or for society as a
whole to rush down this new path before we are confident that both the science of jurisprudence
and the sciences of psychology and psychiatry are up to this awesome task.").

PROMO77NG DIGNITY AND PREVENTING SHAME AND HUMILIATION

2017]1

307

trial.
A broad spectrum of documents and otherwise inadmissible hearsay
can be admitted into evidence at an SVP trial if the testifying expert relied
on that information in formulating an opinion.'"0 The courts frequently
refer to the "professional reliability" exception for expert testimony as
the professional reliability exception to the rule against hearsay."' A
testifying expert will consider both convictions and charges during their
evaluation, and mental health professionals often rely on charged conduct
that has not resulted in a final determination of guilt, especially if those
charges further support an antisocial personality disorder.1 12 Hearsay
evidence, otherwise inadmissible, will be considered as long as an expert
accurately testifies that the relied upon materials are the types of materials
reasonably relied on to diagnose future dangerousness of sex offenders.1 13
The Kansas court in In re Cranell4 held that:
"We are hard-pressed to see how such evidence can be prohibited [in
sexually violent predator cases] when it is an essential element of the
required proof and necessary for the decision-making process of the
jury.""' Therefore, prior acts that never in fact occurred or occurred
differently from what is detailed in police and/or experts' reports-are
presented in open court to further compound the "evil" or "bad" image of
the defendant.
Examples of hearsay that have been accepted in SVPA proceedings
include:
The defendant's complete criminal history, including non-sexual
prior crimes;'l 6

Prior convictions without proving any constitutional validity in
appropriate circumstances; 1
110.

In re T.J.N., 915 A.2d 53, 57 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (explaining that the trial

court could consider hearsay referred to in expert's report).

111.

People v. Campbell, 602 N.Y.S.2d 282,284 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (defense psychiatric

testimony offered to prove involuntariness of defendant's admission and not for the truth of
defendant's statements to the psychiatrist).

112. Commonwealth v. Garrett, 667 S.E.2d 739, 749 (Va. 2008). The Virginia Supreme
Court distinguished this reliance as being legally insufficient when the charges have been
dismissed and in absence of other evidence, an expert still relies on them. Id See also Tamara
Rice Lave & Aviva Orenstein, Empirical Fallacies of Evidence Law: A Critical Look at the
Admission of Prior Sex Crimes, 81 U. CIN. L. REv. 795 (2013) (criticizing rules permitting the
admission of evidence that defendants have committed prior sexual misconduct).
113. In re Colt, 211 P.3d 797, 801-02 (Kan. 2009) (nonsexual prior crimes may be both
probative and material of certain diagnoses and behavior patterns and thus relevant).
114. In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285 (Kan. 2000), vacated on other grounds by Kansas v. Crane,

534 U.S. 407 (2002).
115.

In re Crane, 7 P.3d at 293.

116.

In re Colt, 211 P.3d at 801-02.

117.

State v. Ammons, 718 P.2d 796 (Wash. 1986), cert. denied, Ammons v. Washington,

479 U.S. 930 (1986).
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Evidence that was never adjudicated in a court of law; 18
Consideration of criminal charges that were acquitted;ll 9
Reliance on juvenile criminal records.1 20
Skewing the rules of hearsay and allowing the court or jury to hear
expert testimony on potentially false or untrue information is directly
linked to humiliation and exemplifies "an interaction in which one is
debased or forced into a degraded position by someone who is, at that
moment, more powerful."'21
C. Shame in and out of Treatment
1. In Treatment
Once an individual enters sex offender civil commitment, the focus is
ostensibly no longer punishment but is, rather, containment with an
emphasis on treatment. 122 Some states require eligible sex offenders to
participate in treatment. 123 In other states, where treatment is "voluntary,"
heavy penalties, sanctions and the threat of incarceration directly
influence and individual's decision to participate. 124 Many of the
practices common in the treatment of sex offenders elicit shame, but this
reality is often not recognized or dealt with in treatment. 125 The coercive
environment of sexual violent predator treatment cannot be overstated, 126
118. In re Frankovitch, 121 P.3d 1240, 1245 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005), review denied (2006)
(criminal history admissible in hearing; inmate had no right to confrontation).
119. In re Stout, 150 P.3d 86 (Wash. 2007) (state not estopped from introducing evidence
of incident for which inmate had been acquitted of attempted rape).
120. Commonwealth v. Garrett, 667 S.E.2d 739, 749 (Va. 2008) (concluding that the trial
court could exclude diagnosis of"Paraphilia, Not Otherwise Specified... Sexual Abuse ofChild,"
due to expert's improper reliance on juvenile petitions that were dismissed nolle prosequi).
121. Hartling & Luchetta, supra note 66, at 262 (citing Miller, supra note 66).
122. See Margaret Campbell, Sex Offender Notification Laws: Should They Provide
Treatment Incentivesfor Sex Offenders?, 20 DEVEL. IN MENTAL HEALTH L. 1 (2001); Eric Janus
& Wayne A. Logan, Substantive Due Process and the Involuntary Confinement of Sexually
Violent Predators,35 CONN. L. REV. 319, 349 (2003).
123. Michael L. Prendergast et al., Involuntary Treatment within a Prison Setting: Impact
on PsychosocialChange During Treatment, 29 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAv. 5, 9 (2002).
124. NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-1202 (2016) (it is "public policy" that dangerous sex offenders
obtain voluntary treatment; however, if "voluntary treatment is not obtained, such persons shall
be subject to involuntary custody and treatment.").
125. See, e.g., Anne-Marie McAlinden, The Use of "Shame" with Sexual Offenders, 45
BRIT. J. CRIMINOL. 373, 374 (2005).
126. MARY WEST ET AL., COLO. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, STATE SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT
PROGRAMS 19 (2000) (refusal to attend treatment or denial of offenses on the part of sex offender
may affect parole decisions or result in negative consequences); Wirsching v. Colorado, 360 F.3d
1191, 1193, 1205 (10th Cir. 2004) (appellant must participate in a treatment program or forego
visitation privileges and the opportunity to earn good time credits); United States v. Antone, 742
F.3d 151, 171 n.17 (4th Cir. 2014) (attendance and success in sex offender therapy has a potential
impact on future civil commitment hearings).
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and "the stakes for refusing to [participate] are so high that participation
in treatment is almost compulsory."' 17 Many clinicians believe that an
offender must take responsibility and admit to all offenses (charged and
uncharged) in order for treatment to be beneficial and effective.1 2 8 During
treatment, participants must confess to any crimes listed in previous
documents and admissions may be used against the participant in future
court proceedings.1 2 9 If someone's potential liberty is dependent upon
taking responsibility for crimes or events that never happened, he or she
would most certainly experience shame through the "downward
redefinition of oneself." 3 0 Furthermore, being forced to agree with
inaccurate or untrue portions of an offending history could elicit
behavioral responses to shame, such as hiding, avoidance and masking
the source of shame' 3 '-that might very well prevent the beneficial goal
of getting to the "truth of the matter" in offending behaviors.' 3 2 Nothing
so clearly violates "the dignity of persons as treatment that demeans or
humiliates them" as shaming.' 3 3 Some experts have claimed that shame
is the cause, rather than the effect, of many sex offenses.1 34
Examples of treatment protocols that have the potential to elicit shame
are:

1. the preparation of a detailed timeline and autobiography,
2. the detailed processing of crimes through the construction of a

127. See Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F. 3d 676, 693 (9th Cir. 2006), superseded by, 500 F.3d
978 (9th Cir. 2007), vacated by, 129 S. Ct. 3241 (2009).
128. See Robert J. McGrath et al., Cognitive-Behavioral Treatment of Sex Offenders: A
Treatment Comparison and Long-Term Follow-Up Study, 25 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAv. 203, 211
(1998) (a crucial initial step in cognitive behavioral therapy is for sex offenders to admit and then

give a full disclosure of their offense to the treatment group); see also Anita Schlank & Rick
Harry, The Treatment of the Civilly Committed Sex Offender in Minnesota: A Review of the Past
Ten Years, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1221, 1224 (2003) ("most treatment providers believe that

rehabilitation begins with acceptance of responsibility").
129. See generally Anita M. Schlank & Theodore Shaw, Treating Sexual Offenders Who
Deny Their Guilt: A Pilot Study, 8 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 17, 18 (1996) (first goal
of therapy is to help the perpetrator acknowledge that he has a problem); see also WASH. STATE
INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, SEX OFFENDER SENTENCING IN WASHINGTON STATE: WHO PARTICIPATES
IN THE PRISON TREATMENT PROGRAM 3 (2006) ("[T]he law could motivate some sex offenders to
decline participation because revelations during their treatment about additional victims or

violence could later be used as reasons for the state to file a Sexually Violent Predator petition.").
130. Massaro, Shame, Culture, andAmerican CriminalLaw, supra note 34, at 1901.
13 1. See generally id at 1899.
132. See generally Fletcher, supra note 51, at 16.
133. R. George Wright, Dignity and Conflicts of Constitutional Values: The Case of Free
Speech and EqualProtection, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 527, 549 (2006).
134. See Jackie Craissati et al., CharacteristicsofPerpetratorsof Child Sexual Abuse Who
Have Been Sexually Victimized as Children, 14 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 225, 227

(2000).
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behavior chain,1 35
3. the requirement that offenders confront their own history of
abuse.
4. phallometric assessment,1 36 and
5. the requirement that offenders write, but not send, letters to
victims. 137

Shame is likely to be elicited repeatedly in sex offender treatment and
individuals might experience feelings of low self-esteem, worthlessness,
being defective or empty inside, and feeling unlovable.' 3 8 The therapist
must be able to anticipate, recognize, and know how to deal with the
fallout from shame in order to prevent individuals from becoming
overwhelmed. 139 An important part of this is to establish a "culture of
treatment"1 4 0 so that "the client will not perceive himself or herself to be
criticized, humiliated, rejected, dramatically misunderstood, needlessly
interrupted, or laughed at during therapy.141
Even if participants fully immerse themselves in the treatment
process, completion of treatment does not correlate with release from
commitment. 42 Being denied the rewards of treatment success would
undoubtedly result in a lack of dignity and a reduction in intrinsic
worth.1 4 3 When the supposedly holistic and therapeutic goal of treatment
is infused with shame, humiliation and lack of dignity, the prevalence of
treatment-inhibiting mental health concerns such as depression, paranoia,

135.

James Vess, Risk Formulationwith Sex Offenders: IntegratingFunctionalAnalysis and

Actuarial Measures, 1 J. BEHAV. ANALYSIS OFFENDER AND VICTIM TREATMENT AND PREVENTION

29, 37 (2008) (behavior chain analysis involves an in-depth understanding of events and
situational factors before and after instances of the problem behavior).
136. Many researchers have come to believe that it is possible to measure scientifically a
person's sexual desire by placing a pressure-sensitive device around a man's penis, presenting him
with an array of sexually stimulating images, and determining his level of sexual attraction by

measuring minute changes in his erectile responses. See, e.g., Jason R. Odeshoo, OfPenology and
Perversity: The Use ofPenile Plethysmographyon Convicted ChildSex Offenders, 14 TEMP. POL.
& Civ. RTS. L. REV. 1, 2 (2004); see generally John Fabian, The Risky Business of Conducting
Risk Assessments for Those Already Civilly Committed as Sexually Violent Predators, 32 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 81, 136 (2005).
137. Jay Adams, Sex Offender Treatment: The Brain, Attachment Theory, and Trauma
Processing [hereinafter Adams, Sex Offender Treatment]; see also, Jay Adams, Expanding Sex
Offender Treatment, CALIFORNIA COALITION ON SEXUAL OFFENDING, https://ccoso.org/featuredarticles [hereinafter Expanding Sex Offender Treatment].
138. Adams, Sex Offender Treatment, supra note 137; Expanding Sex Offender Treatment,
supranote 137.

139.
140.

Id.
Id.

141.
142.

Id.
Jeslyn A. Miller, Sex Offender Civil Commitment: The Treatment Paradox, 98 CALIF.

L. REV. 2093, 2117 (2010).
143.

See generally Ploch, supra note 74, at 895-96.
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violence, anxiety, and suicide, can be especially strong and pervasive. 1
2. Out of Treatment

For an individual to succeed in treatment while committed as an SVP,
he must fully participate, potentially disclosing certain information that
may be harmful to his legal case. 14 5 Clinicians working in the institutions
are "required to resolve ethical dilemmas, which invariably arise ... by
breaching traditional mental health ethical principles such as maintaining
confidentiality and promoting patient autonomy." 1 4 6 A limited right of
privacy attaches to psychiatric evaluations and statements made in the
course of treatment. 1 4 7 "[Slexually violent predator evaluations fall
within two established exceptions to the confidentiality of medical
communications: the exception for public health and safety, 14 8 and the
exception for communications made to a physician for a potential
adversary's purpose rather than for curative treatment."1 4 9 Some courts
have held that the psychotherapist-patient privilege never attaches in sex
offender treatment, because medical examinations are not intended to be
confidential.s 0
The American Academy of Psychiatry and Law has voiced its
concerns about such court-ordered evaluations: "Respect for the
individual's right of privacy and the maintenance of confidentiality are
major concerns ... [p]sychiatrists should maintain confidentiality to the
extent possible, given the legal context.""' Regardless, courts have found
that information elicited during treatment could be used in involuntary
144. Fiske, supra note 67, at 78 (citing Donald C. Klein, The Humiliation Dynamic: An
Overview, 12 J. PRIMARY PREVENTION 93, 107-12 (1991)).
145. Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d 1017, 1026 (8th Cir. 2012), distinguished by Arnzen

v. Palmer, 713 F.3d 369 (8th Cir. 2013); In re Colt, 211 P.3d 797, 801 (Kan. 2009) (citing In re
Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 294 (Kan. 2000) ("[E]vidence of prior conduct [is] material to the question of
likelihood that the respondent would engage in repeat conduct as well as to the element of
conviction of prior conduct")); see generally Jana R. McCreary, Not Guilty . . . Until
Recommitment: The Misuse of Evidence of the Underlying Crime in NGRI Recommitment
Hearings, 2009 UTAH L. REv. 1253, 1258 (2009).
146. Bill Glaser, Therapeutic Jurisprudence:An Ethical Paradigmfor Therapists in Sex
Offender Treatment Programs,4 W. CRIM. REv. 143 (2003).

147.

Seaton v. Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 2010) (privacy right overridden by

legitimate penological reason).
148. See Isaac D. Buck, The Indefinite Quarantine: A Public Health Review of Chronic
Inconsistencies in Sexually Violent PredatorStatutes, 87 SAINT JOHN'S L. REv. 847, 850 (2013).
149. Miller, supra note 142, at 2109.
150. See, e.g., People v. Martinez, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 841, 853 (Ct. App. 2001); In re No.

MH 1717-1-85, 721 P.2d 142, 144 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); In re Deville, 610 So. 2d 1070, 1072
(La. Ct. App. 1992) (physician-patient privilege did not apply to bar admission of mental patient's

medical records or oral testimony of treating physician).
151. AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PSYCHIATRY AND LAW, ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE
PRACTICE OF FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY, AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW (May 2005),

http://www.aapl.org/ethics-guidelines.).
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civil commitment proceeding, and that information garnered during
treatment while in prison was admissible in initial hearing to determine
SVP statuS.1 5 2
The shame in retelling prior sexual crimes in a closed, supposed
treatment oriented setting is further compounded by humiliation when
those shameful thoughts, acts and behaviors are retold in court due to a
lack of therapist-patient confidentiality. This lack of confidentiality
would surely decrease trust in the therapeutic process and lead to failures
in treatment. It is the antithesis of "a process that [would allow] them to
participate,

. . .

merit their trust, and treat[] them with dignity and

respect."l 53
Scholars have considered whether the emotions of shame and guilt
can represent a critical "stepping stone" in the rehabilitation process.1 54
There is a significant distinction between feeling shame and guilt; shame
arises from a negative focus on the self-one's core identity, while guilt
arises from a negative focus on a specific behavior.' 5 5 "[S]hame and guilt
refer to related but distinct negative 'self-conscious' emotions. Although
both are unpleasant, shame is the more painful self-focused emotion
linked to hiding or escaping. Guilt, in contrast, focuses on the behavior
and is linked to making amends." 56 Most of the research argues strongly
against "shaming" sentences designed to shame and humiliate
offenders.1

57

In fact,

shame is associated with outcomes directly contrary to the public
interest -- denial of responsibility, substance abuse, psychological
symptoms, predictors of recidivism and recidivism itself. Judges
seeking creative alternative types of sentences might instead
consider sanctions designed to foster constructive feelings of guilt
by focusing offenders on the negative consequences of their
152. In re McHoul, 833 N.E.2d 1146 (Mass. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1114 (2006)
(upholding the admissibility of out-of-court statements made by petitioner to others, observations
of petitioner's conduct made by others and on which the experts based their opinions, "group
notes" and annual treatment reports, and "observation and behavior reports," notwithstanding the
fact that they contained hearsay).
153. Luther T. Munford, The Peacemaker Test: Designing Legal Rights to Reduce Legal
Warfare, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 377, 393 (2007).
154. June Price Tangney et al., Shame, Guilt and Remorse: Implications for Offender
Populations, 22 J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 706, 706. The treatment literature offers

only a few explicitly shame-focused, manualized therapies. See, e.g., PATRICK GILBERT,
&

COMPASSION FOCUSED THERAPY: THE DISTINCTIVE FEATURES 26 (2017); Shireen L. Rizvi

Marsha M. Linehan, The Treatment of Maladaptive Shame in Borderline Personality Disorder:
A Pilot Study of "Opposite Action," 12 COGNITIVE. & BEHAV. PRAc., 437, 437 (2005); BRENE
BROWN, CONNECTIONS: A 12-SESSION PSYCHOEDUCATIONAL SHAME RESILIENCE CURRICULUM 2

(2d ed. 2009).
155. Tangney et al., supra note 154, at 707.
156. Id. at 708.
157. Id. at 716.
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behavior.' 5 8

Instead, the goal should be to enhance "offenders' capacity to
experience 'shame-free' guilt about harmful actions past, present, and
anticipated future."' 59
D. Absence ofDignity in the Courtroom
The criminally based principles of individual dignity, "generally
articulated through concepts of autonom, respect, equality, and freedom
from undue government interference," 60 should apply equally in the
context of sex offenders in civil proceedings.
Perceptions of systemic fairness are driven, in large part, by "the
degree to which people judge that they are treated with dignity and
respect."l61 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that legislative
enactments can result in humiliating consequences, and has underscored
dignity's important role in the law.1 62 In several landmark decisions, the
Court has struck down both criminal and civil statutes that humiliate and
shame the defendants.1 63 With these cases, the Court has acknowledged
the importance of the role of dignity. M Elsewhere, the Court has
specifically recognized the shame that can result when dignity is not
present. In Indiana v. Edwards, the Court held that "a right of selfrepresentation at trial will not 'affirm the dignity' of a defendant who
lacks the mental capacity to conduct his defense without the assistance of
counsel."l6 5 The Court stated, "in the contrary, given that defendant's
158.
159.

Id.
Id. at 717.

160. Miller, supra note 76, at 1570-71 n.473.
161. Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences ofJudicialProcedures:Implications
for Civil Commitment Hearings,46 SMU L. REv. 433, 442 (1992), discussed in Michael L. Perlin,
A Law ofHealing, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 407,415 (2000). See also Norman G. Poythress, Procedural
Preferences, PerceptionsofFairness, and Compliance with Outcomes, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
361, 361 (1994); P. Christopher Earley & E. Allan Lind, ProceduralJustice and Participationin
Task Selection: The Role of Control in MediatingJustice Judgments, 52 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.

PSYCHOL. 1148, 1159 (1987).
162. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 759 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that
one of the critical functions of counsel in the trial process is to "protect the dignity and autonomy
of a person on trial . . .").

163. This is not to say that this line of decisions is unanimous. See, e.g., Florence v. Bd. of
Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1523 (2012) (holding that suspicion-less strip searches of
detainees being admitted to the general jail population did not violate the Fourth or Fourteenth
Amendments); Julian Simcock, Florence, Atwater, and the Erosion of Fourth Amendment
Protectionsfor Arrestees, 65 STAN. L. REv. 599, 601-02 (2013) (detailing how decisions such as

Florence may heighten the potential risk of abuse by prison officials).
164. E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574-75 (2003).
165. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S.
168, 176-77 (1984) (finding a pro se defendant's Sixth Amendment right to conduct his own
defense was not violated by unsolicited participation of standby counsel)).
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uncertain mental state, the spectacle that could well result from his selfrepresentation at trial is at least as likely to prove humiliating as
ennobling."' 66 The preservation of dignity is without a doubt, an
important aspect of our legal system, yet when that system includes sex
offenders, dignity is often absent.
Judicial integrity is the first step to preserving dignity. Judges have by
and large, "bought into" myths about the high recidivism rates of sex
offenders,1 67 and the need for sex offender laws in order to protect the
general public.' 6 8 An individual facing sex offender civil commitment,
will probably experience some lack of dignity due to the circumstances
that brought them before the court, but the improper conduct of judges,
based primarily on their disgust and/or misconceptions of those labeled
sexual predators, can contribute to that person's complete loss of dignity.
Pretextual devices such as condoning perjured testimony, distorting
appellate readings of trial testimony, subordinating statistically
significant social science data, and enacting purportedly prophylactic
civil rights laws that have little or no "real world" impact dominate the
mental disability law landscape.1 69 Judges in mental disability law cases
often take relevant literature out of context,1 70 misconstrue the data or
evidence being offered,' 7 ' and/or read such data selectively, 72 and/or
inconsistently.' 73 Other times, courts choose to flatly reject this data or
ignore its existence. 174 In other circumstances, courts simply "rewrite"
factual records so as to avoid having to deal with social science data that
is cognitively dissonant with their view of how the world "ought to be."' 75
166. Id. at 176; see generally Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 31, at 11-18.
167. See PERLIN & CUCOLO,supra note 80, at 166. See also Ira Mark Ellman & Tara Ellman,
"Frighteningand High": The Supreme Court's CrucialMistake about Sex Crime Statistics, 30
CONST. COMMENT. 495, 496 (2015).
168. See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives on

Dealing with Victims of Crime, 33 NOVA L. REV. 535 (2009) (discussing the "small" likelihood
of ajudge ever overruling a prosecutor's discretionary determination in such cases).
169. Michael L. Perlin, "There's No Success like Failure/andFailure'sNo Success at All":
Exposing the Pretextualityof Kansas v. Hendricks, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1247, 1256 (1998).
170. David Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding":Exploring the Empirical
Component of ConstitutionalInterpretation,139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 577 (1991).
171. Id at 581.
172. J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court

and Psychology, 66 IND. L.J. 137, 153-54 (1990).
173. See, e.g., Thomas Hafemeister & Gary Melton, The Impact ofSocial Science Research
on the Judiciary, in REFORMING THE LAW: IMPACT OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 27 (Gary

Melton ed., 1987).
174. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 897-902 (1983), discussedin PERLIN, supra
note 4, at 21-26.

175. The classic example is Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the court in Parham v. J.R.
442 U.S. 584, 605-10 (1979) (approving more relaxed involuntary civil commitment procedures
for juveniles than for adults), critiqued in, inter alia, Gail Perry & Gary Melton, Precedential
Value ofJudicialNotice ofSocialFacts: Parhamas an Example, 22 J. FAM. L. 633, 633-34 (198384), and Michael L. Perlin, An Invitation to the Dance: An Empirical Response to ChiefJustice
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A proceeding that is fundamentally unfair and heavily weighted
against the defendant due to erroneous rulings by the fact-finder, will
have a negative effect on dignity and potentially provoke feelings of
hopelessness, unworthiness, and being regarded as "less than human." 17 6
This pretextual behavior by judges mocks constitutional requirements of
dignity and is of no benefit to either the offender or the community.
E. How Attorneys can Combat Client Feelings ofShame,
Humiliationand Lack ofDignity
1. The Sanist Attorney
Sanism is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character of
other irrational prejudices that cause (and are reflected in) prevailing
social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry. 1 7 8 It
infects both our jurisprudence and our lawyering practices. Sanism is
largely invisible and largely socially acceptable.1 7 9 It is based
predominantly upon stereotype, myth, superstition, and deindividualization, and is sustained and perpetuated by our use of alleged
"ordinary common sense" (OCS) and heuristic reasoning in an
unconscious response to events both in everyday life and in the legal
80
process.o
It reflects the assumptions that are made by the legal system
Warren Burger's "Time-Consuming ProceduralMinuets" Theory in Parham v. J. R., 9 J. Am.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY& LAW 149, 151 (1981); see generallyPerlin& Lynch, Nobody's Child, supra
note 46.
176. Abril R. Bedarf, Examining Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 83 CALIF. L.
REV. 885, 910 (1995) (explaining that community notification jeopardizes an offender's ability to

reintegrate into society and lead a productive life).
177. On how civil commitment threatens a person's liberty and dignity with "equally drastic
consequences as those associated with criminal prosecutions," see People v. Hurtado, 124
Cal.Rptr.2d 186 (2002), as discussed in Meehan Rasch, California's Dueling Harmless Error
Standards: Approaches to FederalConstitutional Errorin Civil Proceedingsand Establishing

the Proper Test for Dependency, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 433, 447-48 (2008).
178. Michael L. Perlin, "They Keep It All Hid": The Ghettoization ofMental DisabilityLaw
and Its Implicationsfor Legal Education, 54 ST. Louis U. L. J. 857, 860-61 (2010).
179. Michael L. Perlin, "Everybody Is Making Love/Or Else Expecting Rain": Considering
the Sexual Autonomy Rights ofPersonsInstitutionalizedBecause ofMental Disabilityin Forensic
Hospitals and in Asia, 83 WASH. L. REv. 481, 486 (2008).
180. See Michael L. Perlin, "Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth": Sanism,
Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental Disability Law Developed as It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL IssuEs 3, 3 (1999). "'Heuristics' is a cognitive psychology construct that refers to the
implicit thinking devices that individuals use to simplify complex, information-processing tasks."
Michael L. Perlin, The Sanist Lives of Jurors in Death Penalty Cases: The Puzzling Role of
"Mitigating"Mental Disability Evidence, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 239, 254
(1994). "[O]rdinary common sense" is a "'prereflective attitude' exemplified by the attitude of
'What I know is self-evident'; it is 'what everybody knows."' Keri K. Gould & Michael L. Perlin,
"Johnny's in the Basement/Mixing Up His Medicine ": TherapeuticJurisprudenceand Clinical

Teaching, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 339, 357 (2000) (citing Richard K. Sherwin, Dialects and
Dominance: A Study ofRhetoricalFields in the Law of Confessions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 737
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about persons with mental disabilities-who they are, how they got that
way, what makes them different, what there is about them that lets society
treat them differently, and whether their condition is immutable.' 8 ' These
assumptions-that reflect societal fears and apprehensions about mental
disability, persons with mental disabilities,1 8 2 and the possibility that any
individual may become mentally disabledl 8 3 -ignore the most important
question of all-why do we feel the way we do about people with mental
disabilities?l 8 4
"Sanist attitudes lead to pretextual decisions." "Pretextuality" means
that courts accept (either implicitly or explicitly) testimonial dishonesty
and engage similarly in dishonest (and frequently meretricious) decisionmaking, specifically where witnesses, especially expert witnesses, show
a high propensity to purposely distort their testimony in order to achieve
desired ends.'1 8 This pretextuality is poisonous; it infects all participants
in the judicial system, breeds cynicism and disrespect for the law,
demeans participants, and reinforces shoddy lawyering, blas6 judging,
and, at times, promotes perjurious and/or corrupt testimony."1 8 6 The
issues are compounded when we consider the component of sexual
offending. Lawyers have their own opinions, prejudices, emotional
responses and personality conflicts that might no doubt be tested in the
(1988)).
181. See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW (1990); SANDER GILMAN, DIFFERENCE AND PATHOLOGY: STEREOTYPES OF

SEXUALITY, RACE AND MADNESS (1985). On how laws regulating sex offenders are part of a
tradition "of laws targeting 'out' groups in society," see BERNADETTE M. MCSHERRY & PATRICK
KEYZER, SEX OFFENDERS AND PREVENTIVE DETENTION: POLITICS, POLICY AND PRACTICE 37

(2009).
182. See H. Archibald Kaiser, The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities:
Beginning to Examine the Implicationsfor CanadianLawyers' ProfessionalResponsibilities, 20
HEALTH L. REV. 26, 30 (2012).
183. See Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization,andHomelessness: A Story

of Marginalization,28 Hous. L. REV. 63, 108 (1991) (on society's fears of persons with mental
disabilities); "[W]hile race and sex are immutable, we all can become mentally ill, homeless, or
both. Perhaps this illuminates the level of virulence we experience here." Id. at 93 n.174 (emphasis
in original).
184. See, e.g., Marchell Goins et al., Perceiving Others as Different: A Discussion on the
Stigmatization ofthe Mentally Ill, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 441, 441-42 (2010). On how sanism is
more pernicious than any other stigma, see Matthew Large & Christopher J. Ryan, Sanism, Stigma
and the Belief in Dangerousness,46 AUST. & N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 1099 (2012).
185. Michael L. Perlin & Naomi Weinstein, "Said I, 'But You Have No Choice"': Why a
Lawyer Must Ethically Honor a Client's Decision about Mental Health Treatment Even if It Is
Not What S/he Would Have Chosen, 15 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL'Y & ETHICS J. 73, 84-85
(2016/2017) [hereinafter Perlin & Weinstein, "Said I 'But You Have No Choice'"]. See, e.g.,
Michael L. Perlin, "Baby, Look inside Your Mirror": The Legal Profession's Willful and Sanist
Blindness to Lawyers with Mental Disabilities,69 U. PITT. L. REv. 589, 602 (2008).
186. Perlin & Weinstein, "Said I, 'But You Have No Choice,"' supra note 185, at 85. See
Michael L. Perlin, "Through the Wild Cathedral Evening": Barriers, Attitudes, Participatory
Democracy, Professor TenBroek, and the Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities, 13 TEX. J.

ON C.L. & C.R. 413, 416-17 (2008).
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representation of individuals who committed a sex crime. Although
scholarly studies of the effects of "disturbing media" on this population
are "relatively recent,"1 87 researchers have established some very clear
findings that have direct relevance to attorney representation. 8 8
Litigation in sex offender cases is inherently stressful and
emotional,1 89 involving certain identified "emotion-evoking" factors.' 9 0
In other areas of practice, a lawyer who is unable to gain control over
emotional responses to a client might refer the client elsewhere for
representation.191 But in sex offender commitment cases, referral may be
less viable. Clients represented by Legal Aid lawyers or Public Defenders
may have nowhere else to go, unless they can be transferred to a different
staff attorney in the same office. Thus, in these circumstances, attorneys
must insure that the competency of the representation is not compromised
by the emotional interference in the lawyer/client relationship.1 92 It is
necessary to stress that competency of representation is not a simple
definitional phrase. If attorneys allow their emotional responses to
interfere in their representation, they are further contributing to the lack
of dignity for their client and an undignified legal system. 93
2. Overcoming Shame
Human rights and freedoms are granted to all individuals (including
sex offenders) and human rights law provides fundamental protections
without qualification or exception.1 94 Clients should be treated as human
beings who are legitimately part of the moral and political community
and should be acknowledged as both rights-holders and rightsviolators.1 95 It is necessary, in preserving dignity, to acknowledge
individuals as persons and not merely as offenders.
187. Jessica Morales, Someone Who Understands: The Effect of Support on Law
Enforcement Officers Exposed to Disturbing Media 11 (July 2012) (unpublished M.A. thesis,
Minnesota State University, Mankato), http://comerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/etds/163.
188. Melissa Wells et al., Defining Child Pornography: Law Enforcement Dilemmas in
Investigations oflnternet ChildPornographyPossession, 8 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 269, 276 (2009)

("Determining whether or not images are explicit or graphic enough to meet the definition of child
pornography is a primary dilemma for investigators.").
189. Monica K. Miller et al., Addressing the Problem of Courtroom Stress, 91 JUDICATURE

60, 61-66 (2008).
190.

Larry J. Cohen & Joyce H. Vesper, ForensicStress Disorder, 25 L. & PSYCHOL. REV.

1, 17-19 (2001) (describing anxiety symptoms solely attributable to involvement in litigation,
which are quite similar to PTSD symptoms).
191.

See, e.g., ANDREW S. WATSON, THE LAWYER IN THE INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING

PROCESS 23-24 (1976).
192.

Marjorie A. Silver, Love, Hate, and Other EmotionalInterference in the Lawyer/Client

Relationship, 6 CLINICAL L. REv. 259, 296 (1999).
193. Id.
194.

Birgden & Cucolo, supra note 29, at 298.

195.

Id at 299-300.
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In sex offender commitment cases, the defense attorney is oftentimes
the only person that can offer confidential communications with the
client.1 96 Because of this, the attorney may be placed in the position of a
pseudo-therapist during client meetings or interviews and preserving a
traditional lawyer-client relationship may be especially difficult. 97 It is
necessary for a well-qualified lawyer to be familiar with the language and
concepts of mental health law.1 9 8 He or she should understand the
possible effects of a mental disability or personality disorder on the client,
the significance of diagnoses, and the common treatment methods, but
needs to be cognizant of overstepping their legal boundaries of
representation.1 99 Nonetheless, an attorney can employ certain methods
that will not only benefit the legal case, 200 but also minimize the shame
and humiliation that the client may feel in discussing past crimes and
current institutional issues.
3. Judgment is for the Court, not the Attorney
Although the specific facts involved in these types of cases may elicit
opinions and feelings, an attorney needs to refrain from judging their
client as either "good" or "bad" and contributing to further humiliation of
the individual. It might be necessary for the attorney to have the capacity
to separate the act from the individual in order to render competent and
effective representation. Value judgments on an individual's character
hold no benefit in the analytical processing of the merits of a case and
will only further an antagonistic relationship that has the potential to
interfere with rigorous representation.
The general principle of condemning the act rather than the actor is in
line with John Braithwaite's notion of "reintegrative shame" rather than
"stigmatization." Reintegrative shaming treats the offender "as a good
person who has done a bad deed," whereas stigmatization treats the
offender "as a bad person." 20 1 Braithwaite, however, now realizes his
point should be modified and made more subtle:
If a man rapes a child or is repeatedly convicted for serious
assaults, is it enough for him to feel that he has done a bad act(s)
but there is nothing wrong with him as a person? It would seem
196.

See generally Miller et al., supra note 189.

197.
198.

Id.
Id

199. Jan C. Costello, Representing Children in Mental DisabilityProceedings, 1 J. CENTER
FOR CHILD.& COURTS 101, 106 (1999).
200. Donald S. Murphy & Thomas Schwen, The Future: Transitioningfrom Training
Lawyers to Improving Their Performance,40 VAL. U. L. REV. 521, 534 (2006).
201. See ohn Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Therapeutic Jurisprudence,38 CRIM. L.

BULL. 244, 258 (2002).
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more morally satisfactory for him to feel that he has done a bad act
and therefore feels he must change the kind of person he is in some
important ways (while still on the whole believing he is basically
a good person). That is, we do not want the rapist to believe he is
an irretrievably evil person; but we do want aspects of the self to
be transformed.202
4. "Truth is for the Gods; From our Human Point of View, It is an Ideal,
Towards Which We can Approximate, But Which We Cannot
Hope to Reach." 2 03

It is important to remember not to further shame the client by
outwardly disbelieving his recollection of past events or his account of
current scenarios. In treatment, the client is often disbelieved and verbally
attacked by therapists and other treatment group members, 2 04 and in
court, prosecutors use expert witnesses to find inconsistencies in the
client's statements. 2 05

5. "Nothing in the World is More Dangerous than Sincere Ignorance
and Conscientious Stupidity." 206
How important is it to retain an independent expert in a SVPA
proceeding? In order to be an effective advocate at an SVPA hearing,
counsel must demonstrate a familiarity with the psychometric tests that
are regularly employed at such hearings, 2 07 and collaborate with relevant
expert witnesses who could assist in the representation of the client,
experts who would be appointed by the court at no cost to the person
facing sex offender adjudication in the same manner envisioned by the

202.

Id. at 259.

203. Bertrand Russell, Freedom versus Authority, in SCEPTICAL ESSAYS 127, 135 (1963).
204. In State v. Mace, 578 A.2d 104 (Vt. 1990), the court ordered an offender's revocation
of probation because the offender continued to deny the allegations of sexual intercourse in
treatment and despite evidence and testimony to corroborate his claims, his treatment counselor
insisted that he was lying and that this was a "stumbling block" to treatment. The writ of habeas
was granted and the revocation of probation was vacated sub. nom., Mace v. Amestoy, 765 F.

Supp. 847, 852 (D. Vt. 1991).
205. See generally Angela Kebric, Polygraph Testing in Sex Offender Treatment: A
ConstitutionalandEssential Toolfor Effective Treatment, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429 (2009); James M.
Shaw, Sex, Lies, and Polygraph Machines: The PortraitofMr. Cassamassima,57 U. MIAMI L.

REv. 429 (2003).
206.

MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., STRENGTH TO LOVE 43 (1963).

207.

Future risk assessment includes the use of actuarial instruments. See VERNON L.

QUINSEY ET AL., VIOLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND MANAGING RISK 5 (2d ed. 2006); see also

Richard Hamill, Recidivism of Sex Offenders: What You Need to Know, 15 CRIM. JUST. 24, 30

(2001).
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Supreme Court's Ake v. Oklahoma decision in insanity cases. 2 0 8
The complexities involved in an SVPA trial-mental health
determinations, scientific underpinnings, actuarial tests and other scoring
tools used by psychologists-all have an impact on whether the quality
of representation afforded to individuals facing sexual offender civil
commitment is sufficient to protect their liberty interests. 2 0 9 These cases
are truly like no other in the justice system, and require a heightened
standard of representation. 2 10 To meet this heightened standard, counsel
must use every resource and tool at his or her disposal in order to be
effective and to offer ethical and rigorous representation. Counsel must
seek out and have access to expert instruction and opinion on the
psychiatric, social and political elements of each case-skills that are most
likely beyond most attorneys' schooling and legal education. Without
such access, counsel has little hope of understanding the opinions and
expertise that he or she will confront. 2 1
An independent expert will minimize the effects of shame and
humiliation that often accompany these proceedings by (1) showing the
client that counsel is taking the case seriously; (2) empowering the client
by offering another perspective in a trial that is otherwise weighted so
heavily in favor of the prosecution; (3) minimizing the attorney's role as
sole confidant and pseudo-therapist;212 and (4) educating the attorney so
that he or she can be a better advocate for the client in court.2 13

208. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 6880 (1985) (holding that indigent criminal defendant who
makes a threshold showing that insanity is likely to be a significant factor at trial is constitutionally
entitled to a psychiatrist's assistance). Compare Michael L. Perlin, "And I See Through Your
Brain": Access to Experts, Competency to Consent, And the Impact ofAntipsychotic Medications
in Neuroimaging Cases in the Criminal Trial Process, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 4, 7-8 (2009)
[hereinafter Perlin, And I See Through Your Brain] (discussing need to expand Ake to provide
funds for neuroimaging tests and expert witnesses).
Ake was supplemented recently in McWilliams v. Dunn, _ S. Ct. __, 2017 WL 2621234

(2017), in which the Supreme court held-in a narrow 5-4 decision, per Justice Breyer-that the
State had failed to meet its obligations under Ake in a case in which neither the neuropsychologist
who had examined defendant nor any other expert helped defense evaluate the report or capital

murder defendant's extensive medical records and translate such data into legal strategy, and,
when defense counsel asked for additional assistance at sentencing hearing, the trial judge
rebuffed his requests.
209. In re K.G.F, 2001 MT 140,133, 306 Mont. 1, 29 P.3d 485.
210.

See PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 80, at 91-96.

211.

On the parallel issue of how counsel needs special skills to deal with conflicts in

representation in civil commitment cases, see Michael L. Perlin & Robert L. Sadoff, Ethical Issues
in the Representation ofIndividuals in the Commitment Process, 45 L. & LAW CONTEMP. PROBS.
161 (1982); Perlin & Weinstein, "Said I, 'But You Have No Choice,"' supra note 185.
212. See supra text accompanying note 196.

213.

Specific knowledge about the diagnosis or tests relevant to the client is needed so that

better cross-examination of the state's expert can be accomplished. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note

80, at 103.
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V. ON THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 214
Therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) "asks us to look at law as it actually
impacts people's lives" 2 15 and focuses on the law's influence on
emotional life and psychological well-being. 2 16 The ultimate aim of
therapeutic jurisprudence is to determine whether legal rules, procedures,
and lawyer roles can or should be reshaped "to enhance their therapeutic
potential while not subordinatingdue process principles."2 17 There is an
inherent tension in this inquiry, but David Wexler clearly identifies how
it must be resolved: The law's use of "mental health information to
improve therapeutic functioning [cannot] impinge upon justice
concerns."218
One of the central principles of TJ is a commitment to dignity. 2 19
Professor Amy Ronner describes the "three Vs" 2 20 as:
*
*
*

voice 221: litigants must have a sense of voice or a chance to tell
their story to a decision maker;
validation: the decision maker needs to take seriously the
litigant's story; and
voluntariness: in general, human beings prosper when they
feel that they are making, or at least participating in, their own
decisions.

214. This Part is generally adapted from Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, "All His
Sexless Patients:" Persons with Mental Disabilitiesand the Competence to Have Sex, 89 WASH.
L. REV. 257, 277-79 (2014) and Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, "In the Wasteland of Your
Mind: " Criminology, Scientific Discoveriesandthe CriminalProcess, 4 VA. J. CRIM. L. 304,34758 (2016). Further, it distills the work of one of the co-authors (MLP) over the past two decades,
beginning with Michael L. Perlin, What Is TherapeuticJurisprudence?,10 N.Y.L SCH. J. HUM.
RTS. 623 (1993).
215. Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: TherapeuticJurisprudencePerspectiveson Dealing with
Victims of Crimes, 33 NOVA L. REV. 535, 535 (2009).
216. See David B. Wexler, PracticingTherapeutic Jurisprudence:Psycholegal Soft Spots
andStrategies, in DENNis P. STOLLE ET AL., PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A
HELPING PROFESSION 45 (2000).

217. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "And My Best Friend, My Doctor/ Won't Even Say What
ItIs I've Got": The Role andSignificance of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 735, 751 (2005).
218. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Concepts of Legal
Scholarship, 11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 17, 21 (1993).
220.

See BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL

161 (2005).
220. See, e.g., Amy D. Ronner, The Learned-Helpless Lawyer: Clinical Legal Education
and Therapeutic Jurisprudenceas Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome, 24 TOURO L. REV. 601, 627
(2008).
221. On the importance of "voice," see Ian Freckelton, Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Misunderstoodand Misrepresented: The Price and Risks ofInfluence, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV.
575, 588 (2008).
222. Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation:Therapeutic
Jurisprudence,Mirandaand Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 89, 94-95 (2002).
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"The perception of receiving a fair hearing is therapeutic because it
contributes to the individual's sense of dignity and conveys that he or she
is being taken seriously." 223 In a recent article about dignity and the civil
commitment process, Professors Jonathan Simon and Stephen
Rosenbaum embrace therapeutic jurisprudence as a modality of analysis,
and focus specifically on this issue of voice: "When procedures give
people an opportunity to exercise voice, their words are given respect,
decisions are explained to them their views taken into account, and they
substantively feel less coercion." 224 Certainly, the Supreme Court's
recent focus on dignity and the perceptions ofjustice are, perhaps, its first
implicit endorsement of important principles of therapeutic jurisprudence
in a criminal procedure context.2 2 5
How can legal representation comply with TJ mandates and the basic
dignity concepts and structures, in SVPA cases? In an earlier article, the
co-authors concluded that substantive SVPA case law tells us that the
variables that make SVPA litigation different-the need for lawyers to be
able to understand, contextualize and effectively cross-examine experts
on specific actuarial tests; recognition of when an expert witness is
needed; and the overwhelming potential for bias (making the ideal of a
fair trial even more difficult to accomplish)-demands a TJ approach to
representation. A cursory examination of SVPA cases litigated on the
right-to-counsel issue demonstrate beyond any doubt that the "voice"
required in Professor Ronner's formulation of TJ is missing, and that we
have no basis on which to make a reasoned conclusion as to whether
"validity" is present. This is even more important since the notion of
"voluntariness" is certainly absent. 2 2 6
We believe that it is only through the use of TJ that we can best
diminish the shaming and humiliating aspects of these processes. We
know that nothing so clearly violates "the dignity of persons as treatment
that demeans or humiliates them" as shaming. 2 2 7 To be consistent with
TJ principles we must, rather, focus on reintegrating sex offenders into
223. Michael L. Perlin, Keri K. Gould & Deborah A. Dorfman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence
and the Civil Rights ofInstitutionalizedMentally DisabledPersons: Hopeless Oxymoron or Path
to Redemption?, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 80, 114 (1995).
224. Jonathan Simon & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Dignifying Madness: Rethinking
Commitment Law in an Age ofMass Incarceration,70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 51 (2015).
225. See Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 31, at 17 n.87; MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER
ELLIS CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 13-2.4, at 13-131 (3d ed. 2016).

Consider, in this context, Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (holding that "a right of
self-representation at trial will not 'affirm the dignity' of a defendant who lacks the mental
capacity to conduct his defense without the assistance of counsel," noting that "the spectacle that
could well result from his self-representation at trial is at least as likely to prove humiliating as
ennobling," discussed supra text accompanying notes 162-63).
226.

Cucolo & Perlin, "Farfrom the Turbulent Space," supra note 7, at 166.

227.

Wright, supra note 133, at 549.
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society and promoting sex offenders' self-respect and dignity while
fostering family and community relationships. 2 2 8
Consider here how TJ-focused lawyers could initiate conversations
with SVPA clients prior to the start of a hearing: 2 2 9
Have you considered all the potential outcomes if you either
acknowledge your guilt or adhere to denying guilt? 2 3 0
Are there witnesses that we could call to testify on your behalf that
would give the judge a fuller picture of who you are? 2 3 1
Are there any organizations that you were active in before you were
incarcerated-church, civic group? Is there someone from that group
whom you'd like me to contact on your behalf?
Are there records or documents in the file of this case that you'd like
to see so that you can tell if there are any inaccuracies? 232
Can I answer any questions or help you better understand any of the
documents in your file?
Is there anything troubling you that you haven't told me about; do you
want me to see if I can arrange for an outside expert to come to see you
to talk to you about it? 233
If we lose and you remain institutionalized, are there arguments I
should make so as to best insure your emotional well-being "while
inside"? 23 4
228. Cucolo & Perlin, PreventingSex-Offender Recidivism, supra note 23, at 75.
229. For examples of conversations for clients raising the insanity defense or the
incompetency to stand trial status, see Michael L. Perlin, "Too Stubborn To Ever Be Governed
By Enforced Insanity": Some Therapeutic Jurisprudence Dilemmas in the Representation of
CriminalDefendants in Incompetency and Insanity Cases, 33 INT'L J.L. & PSYCI-ATRY 475, 48081 (2010), and for criminal defendants prior to sentencing, Michael L. Perlin, "I Expected It to
Happen/I Knew He'd Lost Control": The Impact of PTSD on Criminal Sentencing after the
Promulgation of DSM-5, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 881, 924-25 (2015). For the significance of such
dialogues in a therapeutic jurisprudence-based practice, see Michael L. Perlin, "Have You Seen
Dignity? ": The Story of the Development of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, U.N.Z. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017), available at https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfim?abstractid=2932149
[hereinafter Perlin, Have You Seen Dignity?].
230. In many jurisdictions, incarcerated offenders who deny guilt cannot enter treatment
programs. David A. Singleton, Kids, Cops, and Sex Offenders: Pushingthe Limits ofthe Interest-

Convergence Thesis, 57 How. L.J. 353, 390-91 (2013).
231.

Bringing in such witnesses to testify would also help to generate an appropriate and

acceptable release plan.
232. In many jurisdictions, persons subject to SVPA proceedings are not given their case
files, and often hear damning evidence for the first time at the trial itself. It is an open question
whether the case of Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (plurality opinion), in which the
Supreme Court found no Confrontation Clause violation when the defendant in a child abuse case
was denied access to the confidential file of a protective services agency, would apply to such a
case.

233.

This is not a forensic expert for the trial but a mental health practitioner who can

provide counseling to the client.
234. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 80, at 170-72.
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A fair hearing-with dedicated, trained counsel-is therapeutic
because it contributes to the individual's sense of dignity and conveys
that he or she is being taken seriously." 235
VI. How

SHOULD COUNSEL BE TRAINED?

In an insightful article, Professors Sarah Katz and Deeya Haldar
suggest that lawyers incorporate trauma-informed practice in their skill
set. 6 Trauma-informed practice recognizes the impact of trauma on
systems and individuals. 23 Trauma-informed practice ensures that clients
have access to trauma-focused interventions during all routine practice. 238
These interventions incorporate an assessment of trauma and trauma
symptoms and endeavor to treat the consequences of traumatic stress. 239
Instead of asking, "What is wrong with you?" a trauma-informed
practitioner asks, "What happened to you?" 2 4 0 This approach has the
potential to reform legal representation by emphasizing the benefits of
therapeutically-informed interactions. Professors Katz and Halder
suggest, and we fully agree that "law schools can and should teach
trauma-informed lawyering, particularly in the law clinic setting."241
They conclude this would go "a long way in helping students adjust their
practice skills to competently and zealously represent clients who have
experienced trauma. 42 But there is more than this. Just as the Montana
Supreme Court "got" the fact that counsel was likely to be inadequate in
involuntary civil commitment cases, 243 so must courts presiding over
SVPA cases "get" the fact that counsel is similarly likely to be inadequate
here.
To make it more likely that lawyers actually do provide adequate
counsel, we thus offer these as baseline elements of a training program.

235. Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 31, at 49.
236. Sarah Katz & Deeya Haldar, The Pedagogy of Trauma Informed Lawyering, 22
CLINICAL L. REV. 359, 363 (2016).

237.
238.
239.

Id. at 369.
Id. at 363.
Id.

240. Id The authors pointedly note: "The trauma experiences of clients have a direct
relationship to how they relate to their attorneys and the courts, because trauma has a distinct

physiological effect on the brain, which in turn affects behavior in the short-term and long-term."
Id. at 366.
241. Id. at 372.
242. Id. at 393. On the significance of the phraseology of such questions, see Kristin
Henning, Race, Paternalism,and the Right to Counsel, 54 AM. CRfM. L. REv. 649, 690-91 (2017).

243.

See In re Mental Health of K.G.F., 2001 MT 140,

¶¶ 34-35

306 Mont 1, 29 P.3d 485;

see also Perlin & Cucolo, "Farfrom the Turbulent Space," supra note 7, at 158.
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A. The "Back Story"
Lawyers must be trained in the "back story" that led to the creation of
actuarial instruments, and, must understand that, notwithstanding the fact
that such instruments do lead to far more accurate results than do
unstructured clinical interviews, such instruments often assume facts-notin-evidence as to the individuals being assessed. For example:
(a) Individuals are penalized for never having been married. 2 44 This
scoring has a disparate impact on those who are intellectually disabled
who, for multiple reasons, marry at a far lower rate than do those not so

disabled.
(b) Tests are normed on certain groups of individuals (e.g., Canadian,
Caucasian males).24 5 There is a serious question as to the reliability and
validity of the studies that led to this norming population if the individual
in question is, say, an African-American.
This training will optimally lead lawyers to contest the validity of the
actuarial instruments on voir dire, and at the least, raise the inference with
the judge that the resulting numbers are not "magic" or a "gold
standard."2 4 6
B. Sanistand PretextualMyths
Lawyers must be trained in the sanist and pretextual myths 24 7 that lead
fact finders to make gross misassumptions about persons who are subject
to the SVPA process (e.g., that "no treatment works"; that "they all
recidivate"; that the stranger-in-the-parking-lot scenario is the most
common fact pattern), in the ways that heuristic reasoning dominates
fact-finders' thought process (including, not limited to, the vividness
heuristic), 248 and in the ways that fact-finders' false "ordinary common
sense" leads them to make fatally erroneous assumptions as a result of
pre-reflective thinking, and observations based disproportionately on

244. Shoba Sreenivasan et al., Alice In Actuarial-Land: Through the Looking Glass of
Changing Static-99 Norms, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & PsY. L. 400, 403 (2010),
http://jaapl.org/content/38/3/400.
245. Id. at 402.
246. See, e.g., Robert J. B. Lehmann et al., Applying Crime Scene Analysis to the Prediction
ofSexual Recidivism in Stranger Rapes, 37 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 241, 243, 250 (2013) ("the Static99 ... is currently the gold-standard in sexual recidivism prediction.").
247. On sanism and pretextuality, see supra text accompanying notes 173-81.
248. The vividness heuristic is the cognitive-simplifying device through which a "single
vivid, memorable case overwhelms mountains of abstract, colorless data upon which rational
choices should be made." Michael L. Perlin, "The Borderline Which Separated You from Me":
The Insanity Defense, the AuthoritarianSpirit, the FearofFaking, andthe Culture ofPunishment,
82 IOWA L. REv. 1375, 1417 (1997).
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visual cues and clues ("he looks creepy"). 2 4 9 As one of the co-authors
(MLP) has recently written, "attorneys representing [persons with mental
disabilities] need not only effective advocacy skills training, but also
training in the realm of TJ to directly rid them of conscious or
unconscious sanist biases." 250
C. Developing Dialogues
Lawyers need to be trained in the development of dialogues with their
clients so as to best maximize the therapeutic jurisprudence outcomes of
the SVPA process. 2 5 1 The use of TJ in this context will "help to create a
feeling of connectedness" between the lawyer and her client,25 2 and will
make it far more likely that clients will be given the sense of dignity,
voice, and validation that TJ demands.
D. A Second Witness?
Lawyers must be trained so that they understand when a second expert
witness is needed-not solely the one who examines the client, but a
second to offer empirical research to rebut the assumptions regularly
made by the fact finder. 25 3 In this specific context, lawyers must be
trained so that they can raise arguments urging the expansion of the
Supreme Court's decision in Ake v. Oklahoma, so as to mandate expert
availability in this cohort of these cases as well.2 54

249. On how jurors look for such clues and cues in death penalty cases, see Michael L.
Perlin, "Life Is in Mirrors, Death Disappears":Giving Life to Atkins, 33 N. MEx. L. REv. 315,

333-34 (2003).
250. Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, "Mr. Bad Example ": Why Lawyers Need to
Embrace Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Root out Sanism in the Representation of Persons with
Mental Disabilities, 16 Wyo. L. REV. 299,311 (2016).
251. See supra text accompanying notes 231-36. See generally Perlin, Have you Seen
Dignity?, supra note 229, manuscript at 48-50.

252.

On how this applies to the sense of connectedness that TJ can bring about to law

students, see Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, How Teaching about Therapeutic
JurisprudenceCan Be a Tool ofSocial Justice, and Lead Law Students to Personallyand Socially
Rewarding Careers: Sexuality and Disabilityas a Case Example, 16 NEv. L.J. 209, 222 (2015).
253. Cucolo, & Perlin, "Farfrom the TurbulentSpace," supra note 7, at 158-64.
254. See, e.g., Perlin, "And ISee Through Your Brain," supra note 208, at 7-8 (arguing that

the rule of Ake needs to be expanded to provide indigent defendants access to funds for
neuroimaging tests and expert witnesses qualified to testify in cases involving such testimony),
see also McWilliams v. Dunn discussed supra note 208; see also Michael L. Perlin, "Your Corrupt
Ways Had Finally Made You Blind": Prosecutorial Misconduct and the Use of "Ethnic
Adjustments" in Death Penalty Cases of Defendants with Intellectual Disabilities, 65 AM. U. L.

REV. 1437, 1459 n. 115 (2016) (arguing that the rule of Ake needs to be expanded so as to provide
such defendants with funds for expert witnesses who could rebut testimony that "ethnic
adjustments" are permissible in death penalty cases); see generally Robert M. Sanger, IQ,
Intelligence Tests, "Ethnic Adjustments," 65 AM. U. L. REV. 87 (2015).

2017]1

PROMOTING DIGNITY AND PREVENTING SHAME AND HUMILIATION

327

E. Trauma-InformedTraining
Lawyers need to be trained to understand and incorporate traumainformed lawyering, 2 5 5 as well as the basic language and concepts of
mental health law (to understand the possible effects of a mental
disability or personality disorder on the client, the significance of
diagnoses, and the success/failure rates of common treatment methods
with this population).2 5 6
In addition, lawyers require a full spectrum of knowledge regarding
harm and resulting trauma for both the victim and the offender. For
defense attorneys especially, this is relevant to fully appreciate the
connection between an offender's own victimization-if it exists-and
the crime that was committed. In a controversial book, 2 57 The Trauma
Myth: The Truth About the Sexual Abuse of Children-andIts Aftermath,
Dr. Susan Clancy asserts that many professionals do not really understand
how, why, and when child sexual abuse is harmful, and that imputing
trauma when it is not present might actually introduce secondary harm. 2 5 8
Making judgments about the degree of harm suffered by a victim and/or
justifying criminal behavior because of previous victimization can be
relations and subsequently the ability to effectively
detrimental to client
2 59
represent a case.
We believe that lawyers assigned to represent individuals at SVPA
hearings must undergo rigorous and ongoing training so as to provide
authentically effective counsel, effectiveness that, as we noted before,
"cannot be presumed in a proceeding that routinely accepts-and even
requires-an unreasonably low standard of legal assistance and generally
disdains zealous, adversarial confrontation." 260
VH. CONCLUSION
Some twenty years ago, writing about civil commitment law, right to
treatment law and right to refuse treatment law, one of the co-authors
(MLP), writing with others, said, "We believe that therapeutic
jurisprudence analyses may be a strategy to redeem civil rights litigation
in this area and to reinvigorate this body of mental disability law." 26 1 A
255. See supra text accompanying notes 236-42.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 191-99.
257. Abigail Zuger, Abusing Not Only Children, But Also Science, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/26/health/26zuger.html.
258. See generally SUSAN CLANCY, THE TRAUMA MYTH: THE TRUTH ABOUT THE SEXUAL
ABUSE OF CHILDREN-AND ITS AFTERMATH (2009).

259.
260.

Id. at 119.
In re K.G.F., 29 P.3d 485, 492 (quoting Perlin, supra note 18, at 53-54).

261.

Perlin, Gould & Dorfman, supra note 223, at 84.
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few years later, this thought was expanded to argue that TJ "carries with
it the potential to offer redemption for all mental disability law," 2 62 and
then later, "to redeem the law for [all] persons who have been
marginalized." 2 6 3
There is no group more marginalized than the persons about whom
we write here, and this marginalization consistently causes shame,
humiliation and lack of dignity for these individuals, and may in turn
"diminish their investment in mainstream social values and increase their
resentment toward society." 264 Our hope is that this Article inspires both
lawyers and policy makers to take seriously the ways that shame and
humiliation have contaminated the SVPA process and the ways that we
have failed miserably at providing effective counsel for those subject to
that process.

262.

PERLN, supra note 4, at 301.

263.

Michael L. Perlin & John Douard, Equality, I Spoke That Word/As ifa Wedding Vow:

Mental Disability Law and How We Treat MarginalizedPersons, 53 N.Y. L. REV. 9, 14 (2008-

09).
264.

Jill S. Levenson et al., Megan's Law and its Impact on Community Re-Entryfor Sex

Offenders, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 587, 598 (2007).

